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SO MANY ENTERTAINERS, SO LITTLE PROTECTION:
NEW YORK, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, AND
THE NEED FOR RECIPROCITY
SETH

I.

A.

DYMOND

INTRODUCTION

New York - home to Broadway, Carnegie Hall and Radio City
Music Hall. California - home to Hollywood and the Walk of
Fame. Tennessee - home to Music City USA, the Grand Old Opry
and Graceland. These three states comprise the entertainment
capitals of the United States. Entertainers of all kinds flock to these
states seeking stardom and fame. Upon achieving such fame, celebrities welcome many benefits inherently derived from their hard
work and persistence. One such benefit is the right to control the
commercial exploitation of their names and likenesses. This right,
known as the right of publicity,' protects and secures the commercial value of a person's identity2 and prevents the unjust enrich3
ment of others who wish to appropriate that value for themselves.
Although the protectible aspects of a person's identity differ
from state to state, a comprehensive list includes name, picture,
portrait, photograph, appearance, mannerisms, characterizations,
performing style, likeness, voice, and signature. 4 New York currently protects four of these aspects - name, portrait, picture and
voice. 5 New York is one of eight states that allows only statutory
protection, 6 and one of two that has expressly rejected a common
law right of publicity.7 California currently protects five aspects by
1. THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.1 [B] [2] (2d
ed. 2000).
2.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995).
3. See id. § 46 cmt. c.
4. See generally McCARTHY, supra note 1, ch. 4. The personal identity aspects that
are protected are also known as the 'methods of appropriation.'
5. See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney 1903) (amended 1995).
6.
DOMNA L. CANDIDO, PRACTISING LAw INST., ANNUAL ADVANCED SEMINAR ON
TRADEMARK LAw 200 (1997).

7. See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d. 580, 584 (N.Y.
1984) (holding that right of publicity is encompassed under Civil Rights Law as aspect
of right of privacy and is exclusively statutory in New York). Nebraska is the other state
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statute - name, voice, signature, photograph and likeness" - and all
others under common law.9 Tennessee currently protects three aspects by statute - name, photograph and likeness10 - and some
others under common law.'1 New York's lack of protection allows
advertisers to appropriate, without the need for authorization or
compensation, celebrities' identity-aspects absent from sections 50
and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Laws.
Does New York afford enough protection to its entertainers
domiciled and residing in its state? How should the economic and
employment impact of the entertainment industry on New York influence its level of right of publicity protection? This Note will argue that, in light of its status as an entertainment hub, New York
should broaden its right of publicity protection and afford at least
as much protection to celebrities as does California and Tennessee.
Part II of this Note examines the development of the right of
publicity and the statutory and common law protection afforded in
New York, California, and Tennessee - the three states whose economies are impacted the most by the entertainment industry. 12 Part
III compares the protection afforded in the three states by looking
at the identity-aspects protected under their statutory and common
law rights of publicity. 13 Part IV analyzes the economic and employment impact of the entertainment industry on the three states and
concludes that New York does not afford enough right of publicity
protection in light of its status as a focal point for entertainers; part
IV also proposes the statutory amendments necessary to give New
York the correct level of protection.1 4 Part V concludes that New
York, as a hub for entertainers, does not allow celebrities to sufficiently protect their identities and personas from commercial
5
exploitation.1
that has expressly rejected a common law right of publicity. See McCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 6.8[A].
8.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (1971) (amended 1984).
9.
See infra notes 55-81, 102-191 and accompanying text.
10.

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (1984).

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See
See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

82-191 and accompanying text.
16-101 and accompanying text.
102-191 and accompanying text.
192-220 and accompanying text.
221-23 and accompanying text.
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II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND AN
OVERVIEW IN NEW

A.

YORK,

CALIFORNIA AND TENNESSEE

The Right of Publicity'sDerivationfrom the Right of Privacy

The right of publicity is rooted in right of privacy laws. 16 In

1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote an influential
law review article in which they argued for the creation of a right of

privacy.1 7 It was a concept that existed in England and France, but
not in the United States.18 They described the right as the protection of personal writings and any other productions of the mind or
of the emotions. 19 This encompassed the right of a private person
to prevent his public portraiture, to protect his pen portraiture, to
prevent his private affairs from being discussed by the press, and to
protect against reproductions, descriptions and enumerations of
such. 20 While highly debated, the Warren and Brandeis article
eventually led to the adoption of right of privacy statutes in many
states, beginning with New York in 1903.21
The right of publicity essentially developed out of the right of
privacy in two phases. First, a right to control one's commercial
identity developed, yet the label only pertained to unknown persons whose identities were used without their permission. 22 Second, in 1953, a new right was spawned based on famous persons
wanting the right to control when, where, and how their identities
were used in commercial settings. 23 In Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc.,2 4 the Southern District of New York noted the inherent difference between the right of privacy and the right of publicity: the
theoretical basis of the right of privacy is to prevent injury to feel16. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1.1[B][2].
17. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
RaV. 193 (1890) (hereinafter Warren). The right of privacy is beyond the scope of this
note. For a more extensive discussion of the right of privacy, see generally MCCARTHY,
supra note 1.

18.

See Warren, supra note 17, at 201-12, 214.

19.
20.

See id. at 213.
See id. at 213-14.

21. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1.4; see also N.Y. Clv. RIGHTS LAw § 50-51 (McKinney 1903).
22. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1.1[B][2].
23.
See id.; see also Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (dubbing the right the 'right of publicity').
24. See Price, 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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ings, while the right of publicity, conversely, has a purely commer25
cial nature.
Today the right of publicity incorporates both phases of development and applies to every person, celebrities and non-celebrities
alike. 2 6 The right of publicity, thus, is the right of every person to
control and benefit from the commercial use of his or her identity
and persona.2 7 Today, twenty-five states recognize a right of public28
ity in some form.
B. New York
In 1902, twelve years after the publication of the Warren and
Brandeis article, the New York Court of Appeals first addressed, and
rejected the idea of a common law right of privacy in Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co. 29 In Roberson, the Franklin Mills Co., while
engaged in the manufacture and sale of flour, obtained, made,
printed, sold, and circulated around 25,000 lithographic prints,
photographs and likenesses of plaintiff Abigail Marie Roberson,
without her consent.3 0 The prints were discernibly posted and displayed in stores, warehouses, saloons and other public places. 3 1 As
a result, plaintiff was greatly humiliated and jeered at by her friends
and other persons who recognized her face and picture on the advertisement. 32 She sought both equitable and monetary relief: first
to enjoin Franklin Mills from making, printing, publishing, circulating or using in any manner her likeness; 33 and second to recover
$15,000 in damages for emotional distress. 34
Upon examining the authorities of the day,3 5 the court of appeals held that the right of privacy had not found an enduring
25.
See Price, 400 F.Supp. 836, 844.
26.
See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.4[E] [1].
27.
See CANDIDO, PRACTISING LAw INST., supra note 6, at 185.
28.
See id. at 199-201. Note that some states protect the right of publicity as a
subset of the state's right of privacy statute.
29.
64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
30. See id. at 442.
31.
See id.
32.
See id.
33.
See id.
34. See id. at 443.
35. The court looked to English case law allowing relief for injury to feelings, New
York case law, and the laws of other jurisdictions. See id. at 444-47 (citing Colonial City
Tr. Co. v. Kingston City R.R. Co., 48 N.E. 900 (N.Y. 1897); Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908
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place in New York jurisprudence because incorporating the doc36
trine would upset the settled principles of law guiding the public.
The court suggested, however, that the legislature could prevent
advertisers from using the picture or name of a person without
37
consent.
In response to Roberson, in 1903, the legislature enacted sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law to prevent advertisers from using any person's name, portrait or picture without
written consent first obtained.38 Section 51 was later amended in
1921 to create an actionable civil suit.39 This law stood unchanged

for seventy-four years, until "voice" was added to the list of identityaspects in 1995.40 During the years in between, there was much
confusion in the federal and state courts as to whether New York
recognized a common law right of publicity separate from the statu41
tory right of privacy.
The first New York case to recognize a celebrity's right to recover for the unauthorized commercial use of his persona was Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. in 1953.42 This case
involved a famous baseball player who granted Haelan the exclusive
right to use his photograph in connection with their gum. 43 Topps
knew about the player's contract with Haelan, but nevertheless induced him to sign a contract to allow Topps to use his photograph
in connection with their gum.4 4 The Second Circuit held that
independent of, and in addition to a right of privacy, a man has an
exclusive right to publish his picture. 4 5 Judge Frank dubbed the
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1893); Murray v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 8 Misc. 36 (N.Y. Ct.
Com. P1. 1894); Chapman v. W. Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763 (1892); Corliss v. E.W.
Walker Co., 57 F. 434 (D. Mass. 1893); Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich.
372 (1899)).
36. See Roberson, 64 N.E. at 447 (discussing the inability to drawn a line of demarcation between public and private characters).
37. See id. at 443 (holding that allowing recovery on these grounds would open up
a vast field of litigation).
38. N.Y. CiV. RIGHTS LAw § 51 (McKinney 1903).
39.
See id. (amended 1921).
40. See id. (amended 1995).
41. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.9[D].
42. Haelan, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
43. Id. at 867.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 868.
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right the "right of publicity," under the notion that famous persons
would be greatly deprived if they no longer received money for au-6
thorizing advertisements and popularizing their countenances.4
The court believed that previous New York decisions implicated a
47
common law right.

Following the decision in Haelan, federal and state courts
struggled with the idea of a common law right of publicity. 48 In
1985, in Stephano v. News Group Publ., Inc., the New York Court of
Appeals ultimately clarified the confusion, asserting that New York
does not recognize a common law right of publicity that is independent of the statutory right of privacy. 4 9 In Stephano, the Plaintiff was

a model who agreed to pose for an article on men's fall fashion in
New York magazine. 50 Defendants, however, published the photo in
two articles. 51 The court of appeals held that the plaintiff had no
statutory cause of action because the fashion articles were newsworthy, and he had no common law cause of action because the
right is exclusively statutory in New York. 5 2 Judge Wachtler noted
in the Civil Rights Law
that the "right of publicity" is encompassed
53
as a subset of the "right of privacy."
The aftermath of the Stephano decision has left persons in New
York with only a statutory remedy for invasion of privacy; which in
turn has allowed advertisers to benefit from the use of certain as46. Haelan, 202 F.2d 566.
47. See id. (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917);
Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (App. Div.
1938); Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co., 180 F. 688 (2d Cir. 1910)).
48. See, e.g., Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App.
Div. 1977) (finding a common law ight for performing style appropriation); Groucho
Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding a
common law right for performing style and mannerisms appropriation); Onassis v.
Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (finding a common law
right for lookalike appropriation). Ironically, the Tennessee courts have noted Onassis
as persuasive authority. See infta notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
49. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984)
(professional model could not assert a cause of action for the right of publicity when his
picture was published in a magazine article without his consent). Unlike California's
right of publicity statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(e), New York's statute does not allude
to a common law right.
Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 581.
50.
51.
See id.
52.
Id. at 584-85.
53. Id.
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pects of celebrity identities and personas that are not covered as
methods of appropriation in sections 50 and 51 of the New York
54
Civil Rights Law.

C.

California

One of the earliest California cases bearing on the publicity
rights of Hollywood celebrities involved the imitation of the performing style of Charlie Chaplin. 55 In 1928, Charlie Chaplin
brought suit to enjoin Charles Amador from imitating his name,
performing style and mannerisms in a movie entitled "The Race
Track. '56 The court held that Amador could not use the name
"Charlie Aplin," or imitate any of Chaplin's mannerisms, because it
was likely to deceive the public, and because his whole scheme was
57
undertaken to deceive the public and injure Chaplin's business.
While Chaplin ultimately prevailed on principles of unfair
competition and false advertising, his case began the move towards
a common law right of publicity in California. 58 Shortly after Chaplin, in Melvin v. Reid, a California court recognized a common law
right of privacy. 59 Subsequently, in Motschenbacher v. R.. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., the Ninth Circuit asserted that California should, and
54. See, e.g., Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(allowing lookalike appropriation). Although Allen was victorious on a breach of contract claim, the court chose not to resolve the right of privacy or publicity issues because
of the confusion among the courts. See id. at 625. See also Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing lookalike and soundalike appropriation); Preston v. Martin Bregman Prods., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(allowing likeness appropriation); Hampton v. Guare, 600 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 1993)
(holding that there was no common law right and the actor's name, portrait or picture
was not used in the film); Maxwell v. N.W. Ayer, Inc., 605 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1993)
(rejecting the plaintiffs section 50 and 51 claim for misappropriation of his voice because there was no cause of action for imitation of voice under New York law).
55. See Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928); see McCARTHY, supra
note 1, § 6.4[D].
56. Chaplin, 269 P. at 545. Chaplin was the first person to use the said clothes in
his performing style and he originated, combined and perfected the manner of acting,
facial expressions, body movements, and other mannerisms used in his motion pictures.
Id.
57. Id. at 546.
58. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.4[D], at n.36.
59. See Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
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would recognize a common law cause of action for the right of
60
publicity.
Five years after Motschenbacher, the California Supreme Court
embraced the Ninth Circuit's conjecture. 61 In 1930, Bela Lugosi
contracted with Universal to play Count Dracula in the film
"Dracula." 62 Lugosi died in 1956, and in 1966 suit was brought by
his widow and surviving son against Universal for the continued appropriation of certain property which they had inherited from Lu63
gosi, and which was not granted to Universal in the 1930 contract.
The complaint alleged that Universal had entered into many license agreements for Count Dracula's character and that the char64
acter was based on Lugosi's likeness and facial characteristics.
While the court was vague and unclear on the issue of post-mortem
rights, 6 5 its holding clearly indicated that Lugosi had a protectible

property or proprietary right in his facial characteristics, manner66
isms, likeness, and appearance as Count Dracula during his lifetime.
Although Lugosi determined that a common law right of publicity existed for living persons in California, Eastwood v. Superior
Court was the first to label this type of claim a "right of publicity"
cause of action. 67 The court held that National Enquirer's use of
Clint Eastwood's name, photograph and likeness in a cover article
that was false, but presented as true, was an infringement on Eastwood's right of publicity.68 Consequently, Lugosi, Eastwood and
60. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 826 n.15 (9th
Cir. 1974).
61.
See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
62. Id. at 426.
63. Id. at 426-27. Paragraph 4 of the Lugosi contract contains the language, "the
producer shall... have the right to use and give publicity to the artist's name and likeness, photograph or otherwise." Id. at 427 n.2.
64. See id. at 427.
65. "Post Mortem" is Latin for "after death." California's post mortem rights will
be discussed infta at notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
66. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 430-31. The personal decision to exploit one's name and
likeness leads to a right during life. However, the court ultimately ruled in favor of
Universal because Lugosi's right to exploit his name and likeness must have been exercised during his lifetime. See id.
67. See Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d. 409, 413 (1983) (commercial appropriation of
the right of publicity).
68. See id. at 421 (the court noted that Eastwood's rights were infringed under
both statutory and common law).
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their progeny, 69 encompass a California common law protection
70
that is arguably broader than any other state.
The California statutory right of publicity developed from an
issue dealing with millions of California residents, rather than with
a celebrity. 7 ' Constituents of a California Assemblyman complained about letters they received from Reader's Digest. The letters
solicited subscriptions and contained the names of all the neighbors selected to participate in a sweepstakes contest.72 The complaining constituents brought a class action suit for the
unauthorized use of their names, which purportedly were used to
help sell subscriptions. 73 The court of appeals held in favor of
Reader's Digest because, inter alia, it was not possible to measure
damages for the commercial value of an ordinary person's name in
an advertising solicitation. 74 This case led to the drafting of section
3344 of the California Civil Code in 1972, 7 5 which included a mini76
mum statutory recovery of $300 per plaintiff.
The California Civil Code now contains two sections for the
right of publicity: one for living persons 77 and one for deceased
persons. 78 Section 3344 provides for a common law remedy for liv69. See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int'l, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982) (picture and name
appropriation); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (sound-alike
appropriation); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (likeness and lookalike appropriation); Waits v. Frito-lay, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 27031
(9th Cir. 1992) (soundalike appropriation); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d
407 (9th Cir. 1996) (birth name appropriation protected even after legally changed);
Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998) (name and likeness appropriation); but see, Taylor v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 22 Media L. Rep. 2433 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1994) (likeness used in miniseries documentary is protected by First Amendment); Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995) (picture
and likeness used in newspaper in reference to a sporting event were protected by the
First Amendment); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001)
(picture in magazine was not pure commercial speech, and thus was protected by the
First Amendment).
70. See CANDIDO, PRACTrSING LAW INST., supra note 6, at 209.
71. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.4[E] [1].
72. See Stilson v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 28 Cal. App. 3d 270, 272 (1972).
73. See id.
74. Id. at 274.
75. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.4[E] [1].
76. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (1971) (amended 1984 to increase the minimum
statutory recover per plaintiff to $750).
77. See generally id.
78.
See generally CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1.
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ing persons by specifically stating that "the remedies provided for in
this section are cumulative and shall be in addition to any others
provided for by law." 79 Moreover, enacted in 1985, Section 3344.1
tracks section 3344's language and provides the equivalent protection for deceased persons. 80 Some commentary suggests that section 3344.1 was enacted mainly to overrule the holding in Lugosi
that there is hardly ever, and perhaps never, any post-mortem
81
rights.
D.

Tennessee

In 1984, the Tennessee legislature enacted The Personal
Rights Protection Act.8 2 The Act lists three methods of appropriation - name, photograph and likeness.8 3 The Act further provides
that "any remedies provided in this section are cumulative and shall
be in addition to any others provided for by law."8 4 Tennessee specifically defines the statutory right of publicity as a property right
85
that survives for ten years after death.
The majority of case law involving the right of publicity in Tennessee has been centered around Tennessee's most famous resident, and one of the most famous musicians of all time: Elvis
Presley. 8 6 After Presley's death in 1977, a mass of litigation arose to
determine if his right of publicity survived his death.8 7 The first
case was Memphis Dev. Found. v. FactorsEtc., Inc., a Sixth Circuit deci88
sion that did not extend Elvis's right of publicity post-mortem.
In Factors, the Memphis Development Foundation (MDF) attempted to honor Elvis after his death by erecting a large bronze
79.
80.
81.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(g).

82.

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1101 to 1108 (1984).

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Section 990 amended and renumbered 1999).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.4[E] [2].

83. See id.
84. See id. § 47-25-1106(e).
85.
Compare id. § 47-25-1103 to 1104, with CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (allowing post
mortem right of seventy years).
86. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.12[A]. Elvis has also created much case law
for the right of publicity outside the state of Tennessee. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters.,
Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 541 F.
Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
87. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.12[A].
88. See Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
(1980).
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statue of him in downtown Memphis. 89 Factors was the holder of
Presley's name and likeness, and claimed that it retained Presley's
exclusive right of publicity after his death. 90 MDF instituted an action seeking a declaratory judgment that Factors' license did not
preclude it from erecting the statue and from distributing miniature versions of the proposed statue to donors of the project. 9 1 The
court held that the right of publicity in Tennessee is not inheritable
and that death shifts the right into the public domain. 92 The court
went on to note, however, that there is a common law right of action for the unauthorized commercial use of one's name or likeness
during life. 93

Subsequently, in 1982, a Tennessee trial court

adopted the reasoning in Factors and held that Presley's right of
publicity did not extend beyond life. 94 Yet the Tennessee Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and held that a post-mortem right
95
of publicity did exist.

Two cases involving Elvis followed the 1982 court of appeals
decision. First, in 1987, the court of appeals again held that Presley's right of publicity survived post-mortem. 9 6 This case involved a
dispute between two not-for-profit organizations over the right to
use Presley's name in their corporate names. 9 7 Because Elvis's right
of publicity was descendible, the court held that his estate could
prevent other organizations from deceptively using his name in
their charters. 98 Second, in 1991, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that Elvis Presley Enterprises, the organization set
up by Presley's estate, had the exclusive rights to commercially exploit the name, likeness and image of Elvis. 99
89. See Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d 956 at 957 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 953 (1980).
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 957-58.
94. The trial court's opinion is unreported. See Commerce Union Bank v. Coors
of the Cumberland, Inc., 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2950 (1984) (discussing the Chancellor's decision).
95.
See id.
96.
See Tennessee ex rel. Presley v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
97.
See id. at 91.
98. Id. at 92-93.
99.
See Elvis Presley Enters. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 897 (6th Cir. 1991).
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Although there has been a paucity of Tennessee case-law involving the right of publicity, the few cases decided have established
that Tennessee does recognize a common law right of publicity.1 0 0
Furthermore, the enactment of The Personal Rights Protection Act
in 1984 has created explicitly detailed language to assist Tennessee
courts in deciding right of publicity cases.10 1
III.

NEW YORK's

PROTECTION COMPARED TO

CALIFORNIA AND TENNESSEE

The methods of appropriating a person's persona or identity
10 2
differ in scope between New York, California and Tennessee.
New York does not provide as much protection for the right of publicity as do California and Tennessee. New York affords no common law protection for the right of publicity, which restricts
protection to the list of identity-aspects in section 51. New York has
103
expressly rejected the idea of a common law right of publicity,
and federal and state courts have repeatedly construed the statute
strictly.10 4 In comparing the three states' protection, a considera-

tion of the different methods of appropriation, and whether the
cause of action is statutory or common law based, is relevant to determine breadth of protection.
100.
See supra note 86-99 and accompanying text.
101.
See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342 (M.D. Tenn.
1993) (a look-alike performance of the Beatles infringed their right of publicity under
The Personal Rights Protection Act because the group name "The Beatles" was a protectible "individual" under the statute, and using the first names of the group members
collectively was also protectible); cf Gibbons v. Schwartz-Nobel, 928 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1996) (dismissing a right of publicity claim under the statute).
102. See CANDIDO, PRACTISING LAW INST., supra note 6, at 186.
103. See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y.
1984).
104. See Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating
statute strictly construed). E.g., Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d 108 (N.Y. 1983) (minor
model could not disaffirm consent given by her guardian under statute); Ann-Margret
v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (nude photograph
from movie published in magazine not violation of right when not for trade or advertising purposes); Hampton v. Guare, 600 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (play inspired
by actor convicted of attempted burglary not violation where statute only protects
name, portrait or picture).
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A.

Name

All three state statutes allow for the protection of one's "name"
from unauthorized use for advertising purposes. 10 5 Unlike California and Tennessee, however, New York state courts, and federal
courts interpreting New York law, have interpreted "name"
strictly. 10 6 Specifically, New York courts have refused to protect
pennames, 10 7 stage-names,1 0 8 name-sameness, 109 and surnames.1 10
All of these courts have noted, in line with Stephano, that New York
has no common law right of publicity."'
California, on the other hand, has demonstrated broad protection for one's "name." California has protected the unauthorized
use of a "name" in connection with name-similarity,1 1 2 magazine
article publications,' 1 3 false newspaper stories,1 14 and even the use
of a birth name after it had been legally changed.1 15 In Eastwood v.
105.

See N.Y. Crv. RiGHTs LAW § 51 (McKinney 1995); CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3344(a),

3344.1 (a) (1);

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 47-05-1105(a).

106. See Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. at 620-21.
107. See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Dr. Seuss's
penname not protected by statute).
108.
See Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (actor's stage-name not protected under statute).
109. See Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (cartoon entitied "The Nebbs" did not infringe upon name of Mr. and Mrs. Rudy Nebb because
name-sameness alone not enough to violate statute); Allen v. Gordon, 446 N.Y.S.2d 48
(App. Div. 1982) (name "Dr. Allen" used in Defendant's book not infringement of real
Dr. Allen's name).
110. See Pfaudler v. Pfaudler Co., 186 N.Y.S. 725 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (identification not
possible if only surname used, full name must be used under statute).
111.
See supra notes 103-104; see also Stephano, 474 N.E.2d. at 584; cf Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (protecting name
pre-Stephano); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (protecting Muhammad Ali's nickname "The Greatest" pre-Stephano).
112.
See Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. App. Ct. 1928); supra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text.
113. See Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 638-40 (9th Cir. 1982) (Cher prevented the use of her name in association with a magazine article published by Forum).
114. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d. 409 (1983) (Clint Eastwood
prevented the National Enquirer from using his name on a cover article with false information about him).
115. See Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409, 414-15 (9th Cir.
1996). GM aired a television commercial during the 1993 NCAA men's basketball tournament which used Abdul-Jabbar's former name, Lew Alcindor, in comparing the number of times he won the 'Most Outstanding Player' award, and the number of times the
Oldsmobile Eighty-eight won the 'Consumer Digest's Best Buy' award. See id.
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Superior Court, involving the publishing of a false newspaper story
about Clint Eastwood, the court of appeals found both statutory
and common law liability. 1 6 The Eastwood court defined the fourpart test for a common law cause of action as follows: "(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity; (2) the appropriation of
plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially
or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." 1 17 This
exceeds the breadth of the California statute, in that the common
law elements are neither restricted to commercial uses, nor re18
stricted by a list of methods of appropriation.'
Tennessee's breadth of protection for "name" lies in-between
New York and California. Tennessee has protected, under both
statutory and common law, the unauthorized use of a name in a
corporate charter,1 1 9 the name of a musical group,120 and even the
individual names of a musical group's four members used
collectively.

B.

12 '

Picture, Portrait,Photograph, Look-Alikes and Image

All three state statutes protect "image" in some respect. New
York protects against the unauthorized use of a person's "portrait"
116.
See Eastwood, 149 Ca. App. 3d. at 421.
117.
Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
118.
See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a).
119.
See Tennessee ex rel. Presley, 733 S.W.2d 89, 91-93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). Elvis
Presley's estate sued to dissolve a not-for-profit foundation that was using the name
"The Elvis Presley International Memorial Foundation." Id. The court held that Presley's estate retained the exclusive right to control the commercial exploitation of his
name and likeness. See id.; see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
120. See Apple Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc, 843 F. Supp. 342, 348 (M.D. Tenn.
1993).
121.
See id. This case involved a Beatles cover band. The District court held that a
stage name of a group of individuals is entitled to the same protection as the name of
one of the individuals which comprise the group under The Personal Rights Protection
Act. Id. The court also found that Defendants could not use the combination of the
four names "John," "Paul," "George" and "Ringo" in any advertising or promotional
materials for their concert because the names had acquired a secondary meaning for
the group name 'The Beatles.' See id. Even though § 47-25-1102(2) defines individual
as "human being, living or dead," section 47-25-1102(1) defines a "definable group" as
"an assemblage of individuals existing or brought together with or without interrelation, orderly form, or arrangement, including, but not limited to, a crowd at any sporting event, a crowed in any street or public building, the audience at any theatrical or
stage production, a glee club, or a baseball team." See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-251105(a).
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or "picture," 122 and California and Tennessee both protect a person's "photograph" or "likeness."' 2 3 Both California and Tennessee
also define "photograph" as "any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape or live television trans1 24
mission, of any person, such that a person is readily identifiable."
New York courts have applied the same strict construction to
the terms "picture" and "portrait" in section 51125 as they have to
the term "name." 126 The New York Judiciary construes the right
recognized by sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law strictly for
two main reasons: (1) it is in derogation of New York common law,
and (2) not doing so would create a potential conflict with the First
Amendment. 127 In Arrington v. New York Times Co., seventy-two years
after Roberson, 128 the New York Court of Appeals noted that the legislature has not chosen to enlarge the reach of sections 50 and 51 in
the years since Roberson. 129 In Arrington, the court of appeals found
that the New York Times' use of a photo of Arrington was not a violation of the statute because the matter was of public interest.1 30 As
such, the topic was newsworthy and the newspaper's First Amend131
ment rights outweighed Arrington's right of publicity.
A more recent case indicating the breadth of the "newsworthy"
exception in New York is Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing and
Pubis. 3 2 Defendants published plaintiff's photo in a fictional article about teen sex and drugs.1 3 3 The court held that "newsworthiness" is to be construed broadly, noting that it encompasses not
only descriptions of actual events, but also articles of political
122. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51.
123. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344(a), 3344.1(a)(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-251105(a).
124.
See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(b); TENN CODE ANN. § 47-25-1102(5). The Tennessee statute tracks California's definition of "photograph" verbatim.
125. See Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 620-21.
126. See supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
127. See Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 620-21 (the right of publicity is simply a misnomer for
the privacy interest protected by the New York Civil Rights law).
128. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
129. See Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321-22 (N.Y. 1982).
130. Id.
131.
See id. at 1322; see also Stephano, 474 N.E.2d. 580 (N.Y. 1984) and supra notes
49-54 and accompanying text.
132. Messenger, 727 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 2000).
133. See id. at 550.
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events, social trends, or any subject of public interest.13 4 Indeed,
there have been an immoderate number of New York "photograph"
appropriation cases that have exonerated the defendant under
"newsworthy" pretenses.'

35

In a few cases, however, the courts did construe the terms "picture" and "portrait" broadly enough to include look-alikes and the
appropriation of likeness.1 36 Other New York courts have found
statutory violations for the appropriation of photographs under the
common law, 1 37 yet all of these cases were decided before the
138
Stephano court, which rejected all common law remedies.
Contrary to New York, most California courts have interpreted
the term "photograph" broadly. There were, however, courts that
upheld the use of a picture because the use met the First Amendment "newsworthiness" exception. 1 39 In Montana v. SanJose Mercury
News, the California Court of Appeals held that San Jose Mercury
News accounts of Joe Montana in association with four superbowl
victories were newsworthy because the publication was a matter of
134. Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 552.
135. See, e.g., Stephano, 474 N.E.2d. 580 (fashion article is newsworthy); Abdelrazig
v. Essence Comm., 639 N.Y.S.2d 811 (App. Div. 1996) (picture of plaintiff in African
garb is newsworthy); Creel v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 496 N.Y.S.2d 219 (App. Div. 1985)
(picture illustrating a nude beach); Lopez v. Triangle Communications, Inc., 421
N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 1979) (make-over picture in Seventeen magazine); Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. 195) (lewd photo used in connection with ISP); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (photo of
plaintiff in promotional materials); Ann-Margaret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F.
Supp. 401 (2d Cir. 1980) (topless photo of plaintiff).
See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984)
136.
(defendant's use of an Onassis look-alike in a pictorial advertisement was held to be a
statutory violation); Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defendant used look-alike of Woody Allen holding a Clarinet on the VIP card for their video
stores); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(defendants used look-alikes of the Fat Boys in a beer advertisement). It should be
noted that while the Southern District denied Miller Brewing's motion to dismiss the
look-alike claim, the court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the sound-alike
claim. See id. at 837-38.
See, e.g., Bi-rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
137.
(holding that photos of band placed on buttons and logos were violation); Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that drawing of boxer in boxing ring was a violation and not newsworthy).
138.
See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d. at 580 (holding that New York has no common law
remedy for right of publicity).
139.
See, e.g., Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995).
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public interest entitled to First Amendment protection. 140 In Hoffman v. CapitalCities/ABC, Inc., the court held that a computer-generated image depicting Dustin Hoffman in a red dress from the
movie "Tootsie" was not pure commercial speech, and thus was pro14 1
tectible under the First Amendment.
Nothwithstanding the aforementioned cases, the majority of
California courts presiding over a "picture" appropriation case have
held that a newsworthy exception did not outweigh the protection
of the plaintiff's identity. 142 In Eastwood v. Superior Court, for example, the court held that a newsworthy article must be true
information.

143

Moreover, the California courts have construed "likeness"
broadly. In Int-Elect Eng'g, Inc. v. Clinton Harley Corp.,144 the Northern District of California held that plaintiffs painting on the side of
his motorcycle was a readily-identifiable artistic creation, and that
fact alone was sufficient to state a right of publicity claim. 145 In reaffirming the breadth of protection for "photographs," the court remarked that California courts have expanded the definition of
"likeness" to include more than just a person's physical
46

attributes.1

Unlike California, Tennessee has only had one significant case
involving the appropriation of "likeness" and "image."1 47 In Apple
Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R, Inc., defendants produced posters depicting
themselves as the Beatles from the album cover for 'A Hard Days'
140. See Montana, 34 Cal App. 790, 794 (1955).
141.
See Hoffman, 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
142. E.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409 (1983); Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d.797 (Cal. 2001) (holding that there was no
First Amendment defense to California right of publicity claim when artistic expression
takes the form of literal depiction or imitation of celebrity for commercial gain); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing summary judgment
to defendants where picture of pitcher in beer advertisement was placed in magazine
without consent); but cf Int-Elect Eng'g, Inc. v. Clinton Harley Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11510, 11-15 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that publication was newsworthy where
photo of artistic creation did not falsely imply endorsement of defendant's magazine).
143.
See Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 425; see supra notes 116-17 and accompanying
text.
144. Int-Elect Eng'g, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11510 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
145.
See id. at 11.
146. Id. at 10 (citing Motsenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th
Cir. 1974)).
147.
See Apple Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
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The court noted that there was no Tennessee case on

point involving look-alikes, and ironically looked to the New York
Onassis case.' 49 With emphasis added, the court held that permitting defendants to use the image of the Beatles would be sanctioning an obvious loophole to evade the statute; stating that "the
essential purpose of the statute must be carried out by giving it a
common sense reading which bars easy evasion."1 50 The Tennessee
court was persuaded by the logic of the New York Onassis court, and
avowed that it is important to note that the Tennessee statutory
right of publicity was more broadly worded than the New York statute.' 5 ' Indeed, Tennessee's section 47-25-1105(a) prohibits the use
of another's "likeness," while New York only prohibits the use of
15 2
another's "portrait" or "picture."'
C. Appearances, Mannerisms, Characterizationsand Performance Style
California and Tennessee, unlike New York, protect against the
appropriation of one's "likeness" in statute. 153 Tennessee's statute
even defines "likeness" as "an image of an individual.' 54 The omission of "likeness" from the New York statute, however, did not prevent many pre-Stephano courts from protecting one's unique
mannerisms, characterizations and performing styles under common law.' 55 By rejecting a common law right of publicity, Stephano
148.
See Apple Corps Ltd., 843 F. Supp. at 348.
149.
See id. Note that the Onassis decision was before Stephano in New York. See
supra note 48.
150. Id. at 349.
151.
Id.
152. Id.
153. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1005.
154. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1002(3).
155. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485,
486 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (regardless of a common law right of publicity, the New York statute recognizes protection for the commercial value of one's likeness); Lombardo v.
Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 1977). The Lombardo court
noted that the Civil Rights law is not to be applied to prevent the portrayal of an individual's personality or performing style, yet there is no question that a celebrity has a
legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality. Because Lombardo had invested forty years in developing his performance style, he should be able to commercially exploit his public personality. See id; Onassis v. Christian Dior - New York, Inc.,
472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (look-alike of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis was an
infringement of likeness); but cf Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 374 N.E.2d 129 (N.Y.
1978) (an identifiable description of a person in a true story drama without showing his
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all but eliminated any action for appropriation of appearance, man1 56
nerisms, characterizations, or performing style in New York.
California has recognized the protection of one's mannerisms,
characterizations, and performing style dating back to 1928.157
15
More recently, California has demonstrated that appearance, 8
mannerisms, 1 59 characterizations 160 and performing style 16 a are at

the least protected under the common law right of publicity.
Vanna White, for example, successfully sued an electronics company for appropriation of appearance where a commercial depicted a robot with a blonde wig, gown and jewelry, standing in
White's customary "Wheel of Fortune" stance, turning letters on a
"Wheel of Fortune"-like gameshow. 162 George Wendt and John
Ratzenberger (the "Cheers" actors who played "Norm" and "Cliff'),
likewise, were successful in an action where defendants used animatronic figures resembling the two "Cheers" characters in their
bar.163 Similarly, Motschenbacher v. Reynolds Tobacco Co. demonstrates the breadth of California's protection for distinct characterizations, holding that plaintiff's racecar was readily identifiable and
16 4
as such, his car's characteristics were protectible.
The only Tennessee case involving appearance, mannerisms,
characterizations and performing style is Apple Corps Ltd. v.
A.D.P.R., Inc.165 The holder of the Beatles' right of publicity prevented defendants from using the group's appearance, mannerface or using his real name is not a statutory violation because the statute only protects
against name, portrait, or picture).
156. See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984) (no common law right of publicity).
157.
See Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928) and supra notes 55-58
and accompanying text.
158.
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1991) (robot
lookalike); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (Count Dracula appearance); Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Cheers character appearance).
159.
Lugosi, 603 P.2d 425 (mannerisms as Count Dracula).
Motschenbacher v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (race160.
car characterizations).
Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 425 (Bela Lugosi performing style as Count Dracula).
161.
162.
See White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
See Wendt, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464 at 1.
163.
164. See Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 825-27. (finding that plaintiff was readily identifiable where he was a well-known racecar driver who consistently individualized his cars
to set them apart from those of other drivers).
165. Apple Corps Ltd., 843 F. Supp. 342 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
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isms, characterizations and performing style in recreating Beatles'
66
performances from the 1960s.1
D.

Voice and Sound

New York added "voice" to its section 51 methods of appropriation in 1995.167 It is still unclear, however, as to whether New York
recognizes protection for the appropriation of other voice-related
elements, such as sound 168 and sound-alikes. 169 Both federal and
state courts have rejected the idea of protection for sound and
sound-alikes, citing New York's strict application of the statute. 7 0
California, on the other hand, has found in two instances that
a voice is protected from sound-alike imitation under the common
law right of publicity. In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit
held that Bette Midler had no cause of action under section 3344
where Ford used a sound-alike singer in a commercial because it
was not Midler's actual "voice" that was used, but another
singer's. 17t The court found that the statute, however, "[did] not
preclude Midler from pursuing any cause of action she may have at
common law; the statute itself implies that such common law causes
of action do exist because it says its remedies are 'merely cumula166. See Apple Corps Ltd., 843 F. Supp. 342 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
167. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 51 (McKinney 1903) (amended 1995).
168. See, e.g., Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341 N.E.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. 1975) ("Artie
Shaw does not have any property interest in the Artie Shaw 'sound,' . . . competitors
might meticulously duplicate or imitate his renditions of musical compositions").
169.
See, e.g., Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(holding that there was no way of identifying plaintiff's voice as cartoon character so
cannot show name or likeness appropriation); Maxwell v. N.W. Ayer, Inc., 605 N.Y.S.2d
174 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that New York has not yet recognized remedy for voice
imitation and courts have consistently held that there is no cause of action under sections 50 and 51 for misappropriation or imitation of voice); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 837-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The statute is very specific . . .New York Civil Rights Law does not yet extend to sound-alikes").
170. See Booth, supra note 169, at 349 (citing Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d
256 (lst Cir. 1962)); see also Arrington v. NewYork Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319,1321-22
(N.Y. 1980) (statute's narrow application).
171. See Midler, 849 F.2d 460, 461-63 (9th Cir. 1988). The singer was told by many
personal friends that they thought it was Midler singing the commercial, and Ken Fritz,
a personal manager in the entertainment business declared by affidavit that he heard
the commercial on more than one occasion and thought Midler was doing the singing.
see id. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344, preventing the use of "another's...voice," but not
imitation of another's voice.
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tive."' 1 72 The court held that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to
1 73
sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs.
The same result was reached in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., involving the
sound-alike imitation of Tom Waits' distinct voice in a potato chip
commercial. 17 4 California's common law protection for voice,
sound and sound-alikes evinces a right of publicity that is thus
broader than New York's strict application of the Civil Rights

statute.
Although Tennessee has had no case law involving the appropriation of voice, sound or sound-alike imitation, the statute does
provide that "the remedies provided for in this section are cumula175
tive and shall be in addition to any others provided for by law."
Therefore, Tennessee will most likely allow for protection of voice,
sound and sound-alike imitation at common law because, under a
plain reading of the statute, and pursuant to the courts' willingness
to recognize various common law right of publicity remedies, these
17 6
remedies are "in addition" to the statutory protection.
E.

Post Mortem Rights

Unlike California and Tennessee, New York does not recognize
a right of publicity after death. Both California and Tennessee
77
have explicit statutory protection for post-mortem rights.'
There were a number of New York cases which held that the
right of publicity extended post-mortem.1 78 However the court of
172.
173.
174.

Midler, 849 F.2d at 461-63 (citing CAL. CrM. CODE § 3344(g)).
Id. at 463.
See Waits, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).

175.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1106(e).

176. See id.
177. See CAL Crv. CODE § 3344.1; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103(b), 1104(a).
178. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (holding that death of actors Laurel and Hardy did not extinguish their right of
publicity held by grantee of right). The court noted that the theoretical basis of the
right of privacy is to prevent injury to feelings, thus the right is not transferable or
assignable, and death is a logical conclusion to any claim. Conversely, there is no logical reason to terminate the right of publicity upon death because the right has a purely
commercial nature, and thus the right is assignable and transferable. See id.; Contra
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) (no post mortem right
for Elvis); Price v. Worldvision Enters., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Laurel
and Hardy); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Agatha
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appeals in Stephano eliminated any common law right of publicity
causes of action.1 79 This proscribed any post-mortem right in New
York because there was, and still is, no statutory protection after
death. 180

California's post-mortem right is codified in section 3344.1,
which protects "a deceased personality's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness."' 1 The Act is known as the Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act. 18 2 It was amended and given a broader
scope after a California court refused to allow Fred Astaire's widow
to recover for appropriation of his image in a series of dance instructional videotapes. 183 The statute specifically states that the
rights under this section are property rights transferable by contract
or trust or testamentary documents.' 8 4 The rights' duration was
amended and increased in 1999 from fifty years to seventy years,
currently one of the longest of any state. 18 5 One applicability limitation, however, is that a "deceased personality" must be a natural
person whose particular aspect of identity in question has "commercial value at the time of his or her death," regardless of whether or
not that person used that aspect commercially during his or her
86
lifetime.,
Tennessee's post-mortem right is narrower than California's in
one respect and broader than California's in another.1 8 7 The stat88
ute provides for a post-mortem right in duration of ten years,'
which is much shorter than the seventy-year duration in California. 189 The Tennessee statute, however, does not require that a
Christie); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (Groucho Marx and the Marx Brothers).
See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d. 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) ("Since the right of publicity is
179.
encompassed under the Civil Rights Laws as an aspect of the right of privacy, which, as
noted, is exclusively statutory in this state, plaintiff cannot claim an independent common law right of publicity.").
180. See id. (no common law right).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(1).
181.
182.
See id. § 3344.1(o).
See Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 41260 (1997).
183.
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b).
185.
See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 9.5[A].
186. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1(h).
187.
188.

Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 to 1104, with CAL. CIV. CODE §3344.1.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104.

189.

See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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person's property right have commercial value at the time of his or
her death, as does California. 90 The statute rather allows for a post
mortem right regardless of commercial value during life or at
death. 19 1
IV.

SHOULD NEW

YORK

BROADEN ITS RIGHT OF

PUBLICITY PROTECTION?

In Zachini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,192 Justice White of the
United States Supreme Court articulated that "the State's interest
in permitting a right of publicity is in protecting the proprietary
interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.' 193 California understands the necessity of protecting
its celebrities' identities. California has the largest number of resident entertainers, 1 94 and the economic impact these entertainers
have had on the state is greater than in any other respective state. 19 5
Correspondingly, California arguably has the broadest right of publicity protection of any state. 196 This connotes a reciprocal relationship, 19 7 in that the entertainment industries' impact on California
has at least some bearing on the level of right of publicity protection. Although New York has a greater number of entertainers
than Tennessee, 198 and the entertainment industry has had a
greater economic impact on New York than Tennessee, 199 Tennessee's right of publicity protection is broader than New York's protection. 200 How should the correct level of right of publicity
protection be determined?
The number of entertainers in the state, and their economic
impact on the state, should have some bearing on the level of right
190.
text.

See

TENN. CODE ANN.

191.

See

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 47-25-1103(b); see supra note 186 and accompanying
§ 47-25-1103(b).

192.
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
193.
Id. at 573.
194. See infra text and bar graph accompanying notes 207-09.
195.
See infra text and bar graph accompanying notes 210-14.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 102-191.
197. 'Reciprocal' is a term of the author, it is not found in any other reference to
any right of publicity writings.
198. See infra text and bar graph accompanying notes 207-09.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 210-14.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 102-191.
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of publicity protection. These factors need not be dispositive such that the level of protection should be proportionate to the
economic impact - yet they should have some weight in determining the breadth of protection. These reasons are inherent in the
reciprocal relationship between entertainers and their state, as
noted by Justice Nelson of the Ninth Circuit:
"California has an overriding interest in safeguarding its
citizens from the diminution in value of their names and
likenesses, enhanced by California's status as the center of
the entertainment industry."20 1
Currently, as evinced by its narrow protection, 20 2 New York does
not factor in the economic impact of entertainers in safeguarding
its citizens from diminution in value of their names and likenesses.
Yet the fundamental reasons for having broad right of publicity protection in California and Tennessee are also applicable in New
York. All three states are focal points for entertainers, and their
respective economies thrive as a result of these entertainers' endeavors. In protecting entertainers' identities and personas, the
state is in turn securing and increasing the economic impact of the
entertainment industry on the state.
The entertainment industry has been described as being
"finely woven into the fabric of [New York's] economy, benefiting
related industries and enhancing community attractiveness."' 20 3 A
study conducted by the Alliance for the Arts in 1995 revealed numerous reasons for the importance of the entertainment industry
in New York: (1) it influences other industries such as fashion, publishing and advertising; (2) it fosters major job creation for artists
and non-artists; (3) it attracts many visitors who spend money (labeled an 'export industry'); and (4) it is a major motivation for
people choosing to move to New York. 20 4 Similarly, "Tennessee's
reputation as a music center was the most frequently cited advan201.
202.

Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1202 (9th Cir. 1988).
See supra text accompanying notes 102-191.

203. Alliance for the Arts, The Economic Impact of the Arts on New York City and New
York State (1995), at http://hellskitchen.net/develop/news/alliance.html (last accessed
Apr. 9, 2003).
204.

Id.
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tage to doing business [in the state] ;"1205 and "the motion picture
and television industry is a leading contributor to the robust economic recovery and future financial well-being of [California] .,206
As such, a determination of the number of entertainers in New
York, California and Tennessee, and the economic impact they
have had on their respective state is pertinent to this analysis.
The local unions and guilds, and their memberships, provide
evidence of the number of entertainers residing in California, New
York and Tennessee. The following unions and guilds are most relevant: the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), which represents screen actors; the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists
(AFTRA), which represents actors, broadcasters, dancers, and singers; the Actors Equity Association (Actors Equity), which caters to
stage performers; the American Federation of Musicians (AFofM),
which represents performing and studio musicians; the American
Guild of Musical Artists (AGMA), which represents opera, choral
and dance performers; and the National Academy of Recording
Arts & Sciences (NARAS), whose members consist of musicians,
producers, songwriters and other music professionals. 20 7 The following bar graph compares the membership of the union and guild
locals in the three major entertainment cities: Los Angeles, California; New York, New York; and Nashville, Tennessee. 20 8

205. Larry Nager, Recording Weak Here But Music Remains a Big Draw, THE COMMERciAL APPEAL, Feb. 23, 1992, atJ10 (on file with author).
206. Letter from Jack Valenti, President and CEO of the MPAA, (April 23, 1998), in
State of the Industry: The Economic Impact of the EntertainmentIndustry on California,MoTION
PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., 1998 RELEASE 4, available at http://www.mpaa.
org/useconomicreview (on file with author).

207.
See http://www.naras.org/academy. Note that some members of NARAS may
also be members of one or more of the other unions and guilds.
208. Interviews with SAG/AFTRA, AFofM, AMGA, NARAS, in Los Angeles, CA,
Nashville, TN, and New York, NY (November 11, 2001, January 15, 2002, and January
22, 2002) (on file with author).
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A comparison of the locals in the smaller cities suggests a similar
pattern. 2 0 9 Totaling the largest union and guild locals reveals that
Los Angeles has the largest number of entertainers with approximately 44,500, New York City has the second largest with approximately 38,900, and Nashville has the third largest with
approximately 8,100.
Yet of more importance than the number of entertainers in
each state is the impact these entertainers have had on the state.
The following bar graphs compare the total economic impact, total
industry job employment, total industry taxes returned to the state,
and Gross State Product in various years. 2 10 These numbers, however, relate to the film, television and art industries, which exclude
the sound recording industry.

209.
Interviews with SAG/AFTRA, AFofM, AMGA, NARAS, in various cities (November 11, 2001, January 15, 2002, and January 22, 2002) (on file with author).
210.
See generally State of the Industry, supra note 208; Press Release, Governor Don
Sundquist, Governor Reports Record Year For Tennessee Entertainment (March 25,
1997), available at http://www.state.tn.us/governor/marl997/tfc.htm (on file with author); Larry Nager, Recording Weak Here But Music Remains a Big Draw, THE COMMERCIAL
APPAL, Feb 23, 1992, atJlO (on file with author); BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

REGIONAL ACCOUNTS DATA, GROSS STATE PRODuCT DATA

(2002), at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp. (on file with author).
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FIGURE 2.
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The New York study conducted by the Alliance of the Arts estimated that the total impact of the entertainment industry on New
York in 1997 would be $16 billion, a nineteen percent increase in
two years. 2 11 Thus, the total economic impact of the entertainment
industry on New York in 1998 would be about two-thirds that of the
impact on California, yet still significantly larger than Tennessee's
projected 1998 impact. These entertainment statistics follow the
2 12
same pattern as the Gross State Product in each year.
One other major contributor to the entertainment industry is
the sound recording industry. The Recording Industry Association
211.
212.

Alliance for the Arts, supra note 203.
See supra note 210, accompanying text and bar graph.
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of America (RJAA) reported that the overall size of the U.S. sound
recording industry in 1999 was approximately $14.6 billion. 2 13 The
majority of this industry thrives in Los Angeles, Music City USA
Nashville, and New York City. 2 14 Moreover, the number of members of AFofM evinces that the sound recording industry has as
2 15
much of a presence in New York as it does in California.
These statistics weigh in favor of increasing New York's right of
publicity protection. Currently, New York's level of protection does
not connote a reciprocal relationship. California and Tennessee
can give guidance in this respect. The optimal solution for increasing protection, of course, would be for the New York legislature to
create an entirely new statute for the right of publicity, instead of
viewing it as a subset of the right of privacy. The inherent differ2 16
ences in the two rights warrant separate codification.
At a minimum, however, the legislature should make four
amendments to section 51. First, "likeness" should be added to the
methods of appropriation, such that section 51 should read, "name,
portrait, picture, voice or likeness." 2 17 Second, to eliminate confusion and inconsistency between the courts, the terms "likeness,"
"portrait," and "picture," should be defined and codified.2 1 8 Third,
a post-mortem right should be created with duration somewhere
between ten and seventy years.2 1 9 Lastly, language, such as "the
remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and shall be in
addition to any common law remedy," should be added to explicitly
supercede the Stephano decision. 2 20 These amendments would effectively broaden New York's right of publicity protection and thus
evince a reciprocal relationship.
213. See RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 2000 CONSUMER PROFILE, at
http://www.riaa.com/PDF/1999-consumer-profile.2.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
The figure is based on the the manufacturers' shipments at suggested list prices. See id.
214. See Marketing your music to the USA, at http://www.troubledclef.com/tc-art5-1.
html (on file with author).
215. See supra notes 207-09, accompanying text and bar graph.
216. See supra notes 24, 25, 178 and accompanying text.
217. While both California and Tennessee contain "likeness," California also contains "signature." See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 and TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103.
218. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1102 defines "definable group", "individual," "likeness," "person," and "photograph"; Cal Civ Code § 3344 defines "photograph."
219. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1(g) (duration 70 years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-251104 (duration 10 years).
3 44
(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1106(e).
220. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3
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CONCLUSION

New York currently does not allow celebrities to sufficiently
protect their identities and personas from unauthorized commercial exploitation.
"If we truly value the right of [publicity] in a world of exploitation, where every mark of distinctiveness becomes
give it more
grist for the mills of publicity, then we must221
than lip service and grudging recognition."
In Abdul-Jabbarv. Gen. Motors Co., the Ninth Circuit held that a
rule which only allows infringement of the right of publicity
through the use of the nine different methods of appropriating an
identity in the statute simply challenges the clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth. 222 New York's Civil Rights Law section 51 lists only four methods of appropriation. 223 Thus, the
statute allows advertisers to use any other plausible method of appropriation without permission, and without compensation. Essentially, the lack of a common law right of publicity in New York,
unlike in California and Tennessee, eliminates the ability of entertainers to sufficiently protect themselves from the appropriation of
all other identity-aspects not listed in section 51.
Entertainers do so much for New York and its economy. In the
spirit of a true reciprocal relationship, New York should do more to
protect entertainers from unauthorized commercial exploitation;
not only for the entertainers, but also for the stability and future of
the state's economy.

221.
222.
223.

Apple Corps Ltd., 843 F. Supp. at 349.
85 F.3d 407, 414 (9th Cir. 1995).
See N.Y. Cxv. RIGHTS LAW § 51.

